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Are Films Types?John
Dilworth January
12, 2003
Noel Carroll has proposed an account of the ontology
of film according to which films are types, whose tokens include both 'templates'
such as a film print or videotape, and individual film performances or showings
generated from such token templates. [1]
This type view might seem to be a natural, or even unavoidable,
basic position on the ontology of film. However, I shall attempt to show that that it is vulnerable to a
certain kind of counter-example which I shall present. This vulnerability arises because of a logical
feature of types, namely that there could not be a single token that was simultaneously
a token of two distinct types of the same general kind. For example, if dogs and cows are two distinct
types of animal, then there could not be a single animal that was
both a dog and a cow. And similarly, if
films are types, then there could not be a single film token, such as an individual
template film print, that was simultaneously a token of two distinct films.
But my counter-example will involve just such a case,
in which two distinct films are associated with a single physical template, which
therefore could not be a token of both distinct films considered as types.
Here is the counter-example. I.
THE COUNTER-EXAMPLEMy example concerns the making of two films. Two directors
Leslie and Steve are independently approached by a scriptwriter Carla, who pitches
a different script idea to each. Leslie's film, to be called 'Greed', would be about a cold-hearted financier whose only interest is in money, who ruins
the lives of all around her in her efforts to accumulate more wealth; on the other
hand, Steve's film, to be called 'Sacrifice', is to be a story about a woman driven
to great financial success by a desperate need to love and help those about her. Both Leslie and Steve are sold on the different script-ideas
presented to them by Carla, but there is a potentially crippling practical difficulty:
neither can afford to make his or her film, since the cost of hiring Carla to
write it, plus of hiring actors, studio technicians etc is for both Steve and
Leslie almost twice the amount that each could raise from backers or other sources
to pay for their respective films. Well, desperate people will resort to desperate remedies.
One of the three of them, it doesn't matter who, comes up with the following
unconventional solution to their dilemma. To
start with, Leslie and Steve will each hire Carla to write their respective films
for them, but to save costs Carla will write the two scripts with a large amount
of overlap between them. Specifically,
all of the characters, situations and dialog will be identical in each
- they will differ only in stage directions and other materials explaining to
the actors each director's different point of view on the characters etc. Thus Carla has to very carefully write the
two scripts in such a way that each of the characters, incidents and dialog in
them is susceptable to both of the different interpretations she originally pitched
to Leslie and Steve. Is
this possible? Yes it is, because human
actions are subject to different interpretations. What Leslie sees as selfish, acquisitive behavior in the leading
character (who of course could only be named 'Jana', for two-faced reasons) could
be viewed by Steve as selfless behavior done with its only object being to benefit
others. Of course, not anything that Carla
writes is susceptable to both interpretations, and as a result of this Steve and
Leslie are often at odds with each other. Hence they suffer through many awkward and
even acrimonious sessions with Carla in an attempt to arrive at a single line
of dialog in the two scripts which each can accept as embodying their differing
overall conceptions of their respective films. Once the scripts are finished, the next stage of their
unconventional agreement must be embarked on.
To save costs Steve and Leslie have also agreed that they will use the
same actors, studio technical facilities and shooting schedules for each of their
films, with Carla serving as casting director and liason with the studio for each
of the films. By now Leslie and Steve are hardly talking to each other,
given their divergent artistic conceptions and the great difficulties under which
they are working, so the burden falls on Carla to see that everything is brought
about in a manner which is satisfactory to each of them.
As casting director for both films she has to audition actors and explain
to them the uniquely confining working conditions, under which (we recall) each
has to satisfy not just one but two separate film directors, each of whom has
divergent conceptions of what kind of human character each line of dialog in the
two scripts is to reveal and develop. After screening out those actors who will not agree to
work under these conditions, or who fail the initial auditions or screentests,
Carla then presents each surviving candidate actor separately to Steve and Leslie
for their respective approval. Naturally,
each will approve an actor only if convinced he or she gives an effective portrayal
of the character in each of their respective films. Hence many candidates are
turned down by one or both of Leslie and Steve, with the result that they are
rejected altogether. Only when both Steve
and Leslie are independently satisfied with an actor's portrayal of a role in
each's respective film is he or she hired by each director to play each of their
respective roles. Once casting for each film is completed, the (if possible)
even more awkward combined shooting sessions are embarked upon. By this stage Carla has to really crack the
whip over Leslie and Steve, to force them to come to agreement on the specifics
of the shooting schedule for each film, the order of the scenes, technical and
interpretive matters of lighting arrangements and camera angles, and so on. But even with these prior arrangements finally ironed
out, the actual shooting sessions often turn out to be abortive, since of course
each director has veto power over any session which does not individually satisfy
each of them as properly carrying out their individual artistic intentions for
that shooting session as part of each's respective film.
Hence many retakes of scenes are often necessary before both directors
are satisfied (both on the film set itself and after viewing the filmed outtakes
from these sessions) with their adequacy for her or his own artistic purposes. The final artistic battles between Steve and Leslie take
place in the cutting room. Originally
each director had intended to edit his or her own film from the surviving film
stock produced from those shooting sessions which were jointly acceptable.
However, after initial trials both Leslie and Steve are quickly convinced
that they lack many of the necessary but rare skills required to convincingly
edit each of their films. They realize
that each needs to hire a professional film editor with a proven artistic track
record to complete each of the two films. However, here as before, financial constraints force
them to economize and hire a single film editor Tom to complete both films.
But what is worse, because of his great reputation Tom’s
time is extremely expensive, and so as before both directors are forced
to use the very same extremely confining joint-approval techniques in making use
of Tom’s services. They are forced to
individually work with Tom in a way similar to that in which each originally worked
with Carla in producing the script: each individual segment or scene edited by
Tom for each of them must be approved by each of Steve and Leslie for their own
separate artistic purposes before it is allowed to remain in either's final edited
film, as spliced together in a single length of film by Tom. A final point: since neither director wants his, or her,
film to be associated with the name of the other director (since, above
all, they wish to avoid the accusation that they have merely succeeded in producing
a jointly directed single film), they agree that neither of their
names will appear on the screen in the film credits. And for the same reason they agree that the
titles for their respective films will also be omitted from the on-screen
credits. For naturally Leslie does not
want the audience to be informed onscreen that they are watching Steve's
film 'Sacrifice', for she intends that they should instead be watching
her film 'Greed'; while, as one might expect, Steve has similarly
strong views about potential onscreen confusion for the audience with respect
to his own film.
[2] The outcome of these processes is a single physical spliced
length of film which 'embodies' [3]
two distinct, separate films ('Greed' and 'Sacrifice'). Thus
ends the counter-example. To conclude this section, I claim that if this example
really does show what it seems to, then we already have a conclusive refutation
of the view that films are types. Because
if Tom’s final, single spliced length of film is indeed a single putative token
both of Steve's film 'Greed' and of Leslie's distinct film 'Sacrifice', then those
distinct films cannot be types, for the purely logical reasons already given. II. DEFENSE OF THE COUNTER-EXAMPLE Next, here are some arguments supporting the genuineness
of the example. There are two parts to
this discussion: first, did each director indeed produce a genuine film?
And second, if the film or films are genuine, are they also distinct films? As to the genuineness of each film, it seems undeniable
that, if the single, spliced master print produced by Steve was exhibited to audiences,
they would then agree that they are at least watching a film.
And surely the film that they are watching could only be Leslie's film
'Greed', or Steve's film 'Sacrifice', or both simultaneously, since there are
no other directors involved in the relevant project.
Thus Leslie and Steve can at least be credited with each having produced
a genuine film, whether individually or jointly, that is, whether or not
their films are distinct films. To continue, here are some arguments for the distinctness
of the two films 'Greed' and 'Sacrifice'. First, each film was directed by a different film director
using different plot ideas; recall that Second, it is not inconceivable that the lead actor in
each film might, in the case of Leslie's film 'Greed', win an Oscar for her brilliant, convincing
portrayal of the main character's single-minded egotism, whereas in Steve's film 'Sacrifice' she might
generally be condemmed for her shallow, unconvincing portrayal of a woman desperately
trying to help those around her. Indeed,
arguably any greater success in her portrayal in one film is bound to correlate
with some lesser success in her different portrayal in the other film, given the
divergent interpretations given to the two characters by each director.
Thus, arguably the distinctness of the two films is a
simple matter of logic: the lead actor's portrayals could not both be convincing
and unconvincing unless they were portrayals of distinct characters, in
films which are themselves distinct because of (among other things) the differing
underlying intentions of the two directors with respect to those two characters. [5]
And
third, there is an equally clinching, though perhaps more technical, reason as
to why the two films must be distinct. It
is generally agreed that the title of an artwork plays an integral part
in characterizing the aesthetic qualities of any artwork--so much so, that
even two otherwise identical artworks must be distinct if they happen to have
different titles, as has been convincingly argued for by Jerrold Levinson in the
case of musical works.
[6] But in the present case, the two films in question--Leslie's
film 'Greed' and Steve's film 'Sacrifice'--do indeed have distinct titles,
[7] which graphically sum up each director's differing
plot ideas, and hence which films must be aesthetically, and hence ontologically,
distinct works. Indeed, arguably this point alone is sufficient
to conclusively refute any attempts to explain away the current two-film case
as really a case of a single, jointly directed film. III. IS THIS AN ISOLATED COUNTER-EXAMPLE? As a last desperate defense of
the type view of films, it might be claimed that my counter-example is an isolated
special case, which does not prove that films in general cannot be types. But
this desperate expedient can also be refuted, as follows. All that is necessary is to show that either
film could have been produced without the other, so that it is a merely
contingent fact about each film that it was causally produced in the unusual manner
described: thus there is nothing logically or ontologically unusual about either
film as such, and so the counter-example does refute the type view for films in
general. The basis of my refutation is
that the very same single spliced master length of film discussed above could
have been arrived at by a series of causal processes which involved the shooting
of only one of the relevant films--such as Leslie's film 'Greed'. For there are of course many ways in which the actual
causal sequence could have been different, and yet still have been physically
the same causal sequence which produced Leslie's film. For example, one of the scenes which was shot
on a Tuesday might have been shot on a Wednesday instead. (A trivial causal difference.)
Another scene might have been produced as the result of the first attempted
shooting of a given technically difficult scene, instead of what was in actuality
the nineteenth attempt at that scene (a less trivial causal difference.) But
most importantly for our purposes, the particular causal chain which produced
Leslie's film might not have involved Steve's film-making at all, nor any of the
(admittedly somewhat mind-boggling) complications resulting from his concurrent
attempts to make his film while Leslie was making hers. It seems undeniable that Leslie could have
made exactly the same directorial decisions regarding her script, casting, scene-shooting
and final cutting decisions that she did even if Steve and any activities of his
had played no causal part whatever in her film-making. Indeed, not only could Leslie have done this (in
some abstract empirical sense, such as that her doing so would not have been incompatible
with any known physical laws), but we have good evidence that it is a realistic
artistic possibility that she would have done this, assuming that her general
artistic intentions were the same in each case. For at each and every stage in the film-making
process Leslie freely made the artistic decisions that she did, even though she
could have made different ones if she had wanted to. As a competent, serious artist Leslie would
not have allowed her overall artistic purposes to be deflected or compromised
by any of the difficult practical hurdles or stumbling-blocks which are part of
the environment in which every artist must work - including those unusual difficulties
which arose because of Steve's film-making activities. Hence there is no reason to think she would
have proceeded differently, even if Steve's activities had been causally absent
from her film-making. The upshot of this discussion is that Leslie's film is
indeed logically independent from that of Steve, because it is a realistic possibility
that she could have, and would have, made the same film, with the same overall
artistic intentions, even if Steve had played no causal part whatever in her film-making.
[1]
See his article 'The Ontology of Mass Art', The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 55 (1997), pp.187-199, the core of which is also reprinted
in his book A Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998). [2] The distinctness of the film titles is the basis of an important
argument for the non-identity of the corresponding films: see Section 2. [3] I use the term 'embodies' here merely as a neutral stand-in for
whatever relation actually holds between the length of film, and each of the films
in question.
[4] This argument
for the distinctness of the films would apply even if the directors had had substantially
the same film intentions, since arguably the two films would be aesthetically
different simply because of each director's own identity, distinctive background
and style of filmmaking, even if their overt intentions were the same in
a given case. Jerrold Levinson argues for a similar view of musical works in J.
Levinson, Music, Art, and Metaphysics :
Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1990), Ch. 4. [5] I assume here that at least some such critical judgments are capable
of being true or false, and of being inconsistent with other critical judgments,
so that inconsistent pairs cannot be true together of the same film.
See R. A. Stecker, 'Incompatible Interpretations', Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50, no. 4 (1992), pp. 291-298, for arguments
in support of this view. [6]
Levinson argues this case in his ibid., Ch. 8, 'Titles'.
[7] Note that it
would not be convincing to argue that really both films are untitled, merely
because their titles do not appear onscreen (as noted in the description of the
case). For it is artistic intentions
that determine whether, or what, title an artwork has, rather than any further
contingent issues about how the artist decides to communicate the relevant title
to her audience. [8] For related anti-type arguments as applied to artworks more generally
see my papers "Artworks Versus Designs," The British Journal of Aesthetics,
vol. 41 no. 2 (April 2001), pp. 162-177; "A Representational Theory of Artefacts
and Artworks," The British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 41 no. 4 (October
2001), pp. 353-370; "Theater, Representation, Types and Interpretation",
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 39 no. 2 (April 2002), pp.
197-209; and (forthcoming) "A Counter-Example to Theatrical Type Theories," Philosophia
30, nos. 3-4 (2002).
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